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PREVIEW; State v. Hinman: Reconsidering the
Retroactive Provisions of the Sexual or Violent Offender
Registration Act
Marisa Owens*
The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral argument in State v.
Hinman on Friday, April 8, 2022, at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom of
the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building,
Helena, Montana. Chad Wright and Kristina L. Neal are expected to
appear on behalf of defendant-appellant, Richard Denver Hinman.
Austin Knudsen and Eileen Joyce are expected to appear on behalf
of plaintiff-appellee, the State of Montana.
I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Denver Hinman appeals from his conviction under
Montana Code Annotated § 46-23-507, failure to register as a sex
offender, in the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County.1
The Montana Supreme Court will review: (i) whether the retroactive
application of the Sexual Offender Registry Act (“SORA”) has a
punitive effect violating the ex post facto clause found at Article II,
Section 31 of the Montana Constitution;2 (ii) whether the lifetime
registration requirement of the SORA violates Mr. Hinman’s due
process rights;3 and (iii) whether the SORA deprives Mr. Hinman of
his civil rights under Article II, Section 28 of the Montana
Constitution.4 This Preview limits its focus to the first issue. For the
reasons discussed below, the Court will likely find the amended
SORA is a violation of the ex post facto clause of the Montana
Constitution.

J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University
of Montana, Class of 2023.
1
Brief of Appellant at 1, State v. Hinman, No. DA 221-0197 (Mont.
Sept. 15, 2021), https://perma.cc/X2EF-AW46; Brief of Appellee at 1, 11 n.1,
State v. Hinman, No. DA 221-0197 (Mont. Nov. 30, 2021),
https://perma.cc/L4RW-LENH.
2
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 6.
3
Id. at 17.
4
Id. at 19.
*
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Hinman was convicted of felony sexual assault and sentenced
to prison in 1994.5 He was discharged from prison six years later.6
Under the SORA, Hinman was required to register as a sexual
offender. 7 As a level two sex offender, 8 Hinman must submit a
registration verification form biannually to the Department of
Justice. 9 Hinman changed his residence and failed to return his
registration verification form in 2019.10 The Department of Justice
notified law enforcement of Hinman’s noncompliance.11 The Silver
Bow County Attorney’s Office charged Hinman for failing to
register as a sexual offender under Montana Code Annotated § 4623-507.12
In the district court, Hinman filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
that the retroactive application of the SORA violates the ex post
facto clauses of the United States and Montana Constitutions. 13
Before a plea hearing, the State argued that the Montana Supreme
Court had already upheld the retroactive application of the SORA.14
The district court agreed, denying Hinman’s motion. 15 Hinman
plead guilty while reserving his right to appeal the denial of his
motion to dismiss. 16 The district court sentenced Hinman to four
years, all suspended.17 Hinman appealed.18
Hinman’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel of
record after determining that any issue raised on appeal would be
5

Id. at 1.
Id. at 3.
7
Brief of Appellee, supra note 1, at 2.
8
Id.
9
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-504(6)(a)(ii) (2021). Hinman was charged
with failing to register under Montana Code Annotated § 46-23-507 (2017);
however, SORA has not been amended in a way that affects Hinman.
Accordingly, this Preview discusses the 2021 SORA currently in effect. See
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 11 n.1.
10
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 2–3.
11
Brief of Appellee, supra note 1, at 2.
12
Id. at 3, 11 n.1.
13
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.
14
Id. at 4.
15
Id.
16
Brief of Appellee, supra note 1, at 3.
17
Id. at 1–2.
18
Notice of Appeal, State v. Hinman, No. DA 20-0197 (Mont. Apr. 4,
2020), https://perma.cc/PUV6-H6PU.
6

2022

PREVIEW: STATE V. HINMAN

24

frivolous or wholly without merit. 19 The motion accompanied a
mandatory brief 20 pursuant to Anders v. California, 21 identifying
issues that “arguably support an appeal.”22 Counsel recommended
the Montana Supreme Court revisit its decision in State v. Mount,23
upholding the SORA’s retroactive application. 24 On August 17,
2021, the Montana Supreme Court denied the motion.25 It concluded
that “a nonfrivolous issue exists as to whether this Court should
reconsider [its] determination in [Mount] upholding the retroactive
provision of the Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act.”26
A. The Original SORA
The Montana Legislature enacted the SORA on July 1, 1989.27
The law required convicted sex offenders to register with local law
enforcement within fourteen days of entering a county. 28 Sexual
offenders had the duty to inform law enforcement of any residence
changes within ten days. 29 A sexual offender was required to
register for ten years after their conviction if they were not
imprisoned or ten years after release from prison. 30 Provided the
sexual offender did not commit another sexual offense within those
ten years, the duty to register automatically terminated.31 A sexual
offender who knowingly failed to register was subject to at least 90
days imprisonment, a fine that could not exceed $250, or both.32

19

Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record, State v. Hinman, No. DA
221-0197 (Mont. July 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/2FKH-SP3W.
20
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-103(2) (2021).
21
386 U.S. 738 (1967).
22
Anders Brief of Appellant at 5, State v. Hinman, No. DA-221-0197
(Mont. July 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/H85V-TPZ2.
23
78 P.3d 829 (Mont. 2003).
24
Anders Brief of Appellant, supra note 22, at 5–9.
25
In the Supreme Court of The State of Montana, State v. Hinman, No.
DA-221-0197 (Mont. Aug. 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/7MQY-TA7F.
26
Id.
27
Sexual Offender Registration Act, S.B. 84, 51st Leg. (Mont. 1989)
(in effect when Hinman plead guilty to felony sexual assault in 1994).
28
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-504 (1989).
29
Id. at § 46-23-505.
30
Id. at § 46-23-506(1).
31
Id. at § 46-23-504(2).
32
Id. at § 46-23-507.
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B. State v. Mount
Robert Mount was convicted of sexual intercourse without
consent in 1984 and released from prison in 1996.33 The Montana
Legislature amended the SORA in 1995, changing the registration
period for offenders from ten years to a lifetime.34 Offenders could
petition for removal from the registry after ten years if they met
specific requirements, such as showing they have abided by the laws
and “that relief from registration is in the best interest of society”
and no longer “necessary for public protection.”35 The SORA was
amended again in 1997 36 to retroactively apply to offenders
“sentenced or who are in custody or under the supervision of the
department of corrections on or after July 1, 1989.”37 Mount was
charged in 2000 for failing to register as an offender. 38 Mount
argued that the amendments to the SORA were “ex post facto
because it subjected him to enhanced punishment based on his prior
conviction.” 39 In 2003, the Montana Supreme Court reviewed
Mount’s claim in State v. Mount.40
1. Ex Post Facto Clause
The Montana Supreme Court determined the SORA’s
requirements were not retroactive punishment prohibited by the ex
post facto clauses of the United States and Montana Constitutions.41
Lockstep with the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Smith
v. Doe, 42 the Montana Supreme Court first determined the
legislature’s intent for enacting the law.43 The Court must “ascertain
whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’

33

State v. Mount, 78 P.3d 829, 832 (2003).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-506(1) (1995).
35
Id. at § 46-23-506(2).
36
The amendment created individualized assessments to determine the
offender’s risk of recidivism from low, moderate, or high and designate the
offender as level one, level two, or level three, respectively. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-23-509 (1997).
37
Mount, 78 P.3d at 832.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 833.
40
Id. at 829.
41
Id. at 835.
42
538 U.S. 84 (2003).
43
Mount, 78 P.3d at 835.
34
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proceedings.” 44 The Court gives deference to the “legislature’s
stated intent;”45 therefore, only upon serious proof of the contrary
will the Court override the legislature’s intent “and transform what
has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”46
To determine intent, the Court looks to the law’s declared
purpose and structure. 47 If the Court finds either the purpose or
structure to be punitive, the analysis ends.48 However, if neither are
punitive, the law intends “to enact a civil regulatory scheme.”49 In
Mount, the Court found the primary purpose of the law was “to
provide parents with information necessary to protect themselves
and their vulnerable children and to provide law enforcement with
information necessary to track a class of offenders who have a high
propensity for recidivism.”50
The next step of the analysis is to determine the effect of the
51
law. The Montana Supreme Court applied the same factors the
United States Supreme Court applied in Smith, 52 known as the
Mendoza-Martinez factors53:
(1) whether the law imposes an affirmative restraint or
disability; (2) the historical treatment of the law; (3) a
finding of scienter; (4) whether the law was traditionally
aimed at punishment; (5) whether the law applies to criminal
behavior; (6) whether the law has a nonpunitive purpose; and
(7) the excessiveness of the law in application.54
If the totality of the factors results in a nonpunitive effect, the law is
constitutional.55
In Mount: (1) The Court found that the SORA had an indirect
restraint imposed on Mount, he had to appear in person once, there
was no restraint on where he lived, and could petition the Court after
ten years for relief, 56 (2) the stigma from registering as a sex
44
Smith, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
361 (1997)).
45
Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (quoting Kansas, 521 U.S. at 361).
46
Id. (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)).
47
Mount, 78 P.3d at 835.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 838.
51
Id. at 835 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92–93 (2003)).
52
Id. (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 97).
53
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
54
Mount, 78 P.3d at 835 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 97).
55
Id. at 835–36 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 97).
56
Id. at 837–38.
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offender is not from “public shaming,” rather, the embarrassment
Mount experiences is from his sexual offense and does not constitute
historical shaming punishments, 57 (3) the charge of failing to
register is a separate crime from the previous sexual offense,58 (4)
the incidental effect of deterrence “does not . . . implicate
punishment, as long as the law is reasonably related to the law’s
purpose,”59 (5) Mount is being punished for failing to register, a new
offense,60 (6) Mount conceded a nonpunitive purpose existed,61 and
(7) the SORA is “tailored to disclose only necessary information”
limited to the individual level of the offender.62 Further, although
Mount was registered for life, he may petition for relief.63 The Court
held the SORA was nonpunitive in effect because none of the
Mendoza-Martinez factors were met; therefore, the SORA was
upheld as not violating the ex post facto clauses of the United States
and Montana Constitutions.64
2. Dissent
Justice Leaphart agreed with the reasoning of Justices Stevens,
Ginsberg, and Breyer in Smith.65 Justice Stevens recognized that the
“unique consequences imposed by the registration requirement are
punitive in that they share three characteristics, which in the
aggregate are not present in any civil sanction.” 66 The three
characteristics are that “[t]he sanctions (1) constitute a severe
deprivation of the offender’s liberty, (2) are imposed on everyone
who is convicted of a relevant criminal offense, and (3) are imposed
only on those criminals.”67 Justice Leaphart reasoned that because
failure to register is not imposed on anyone other than persons who
commit a criminal offense and because the requirements “severely

57

Id. at 838.
Id. at 839.
59
Id. (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 102).
60
Id. at 839–40.
61
Id. at 840.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 841.
65
Id. at 842 (Leaphart, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84
58

(2003)).
66
67

Id. (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 112 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
Id. (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 112 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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impairs a person’s liberty,” the SORA is punishment.68 Thus, Justice
Leaphart determined that the retroactive application of the SORA
violated the ex post facto clause.69
C. The Current SORA
There have been amendments to the SORA since the Court
heard Mount. The Department of Justice mails a verification form to
level one offenders and violent offenders every year; every 180 days
for a level two offender; and every 90 days for a level three
offender.70 The form requires the offender’s notarized signature and
the form must be returned in person to the registration agency within
ten days after receipt. 71 When returning the form offenders are
required to take a new photograph.72
The SORA now requires that offenders must provide a DNA
sample; their name and aliases; social security number; resident
information; place of employment; the name and address of any
school offender attends; driver’s license number; “description and
license number of any motor vehicle owned or operated by the
offender”; and all social media screen names and email addresses.73
The amount of information disseminated to the public is determined
by the offender’s risk level.74
Although sex offenders must register for life, regardless of
their level,75 a level one sex offender may petition for relief after
ten years of registration, and a level two offender76 may petition
after twenty-five years of registration.77 The court may grant the
offender’s petition upon finding “the offender has remained a lawabiding citizen” and “continued registration is not necessary for
public protection and that relief from registration is in the best
68

Id. (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 112 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
Id.
70
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-504(6) (2021).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at § 46-23-504(3).
74
Id. at § 46-23-508.
75
Id. at § 46-23-506.
76
A level two offender may complete a treatment program and petition
the court for a change in the offender’s risk level designation “if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the offender's risk of committing a repeat
sexual offense has changed since the time sentence was imposed.” Id. at § 4623-509(3).
77
Id. at § 46-23-506(3).
69
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interest of society.”78 Notably, Montana Code Annotated § 46-23506 was amended in 2021 79 to reflect the Montana Supreme
Court’s holding in State v. Sedler.80 In Sedler, the Court held the
requirement that a violent offender had to register for ten years then
petition for removal unfairly extended the maximum time that a
violent offender must be on the registry, the Court found this
violated substantive due process rights.81 The Court distinguished
the difference between the petition process for violent offenders
from that of sex offenders. The requirement violent offenders
register for ten years was ministerial and “vastly different than the
judicial determination requiring discretionary considerations that
appl[y] to [sexual] offenders [who are] required to register for
life.”82 Montana Code Annotated § 46-23-506 now reflects violent
offenders are automatically removed from the registry after ten
years if they complied with the requirements over that period.83
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
A. Appellant’s Argument
Hinman argues the Amended SORA has a punitive effect;
therefore, the retroactive application violates the Montana
Constitution. 84 First, to support his argument that the SORA is
punitive, Hinman points to other states who have determined their
registration requirements violated state constitutional prohibitions
against ex post facto laws.85 Hinman notes the Supreme Court of
Alaska held the retroactive application of the SORA violated the ex
post facto clause of the Alaska Constitution even though it was
Alaska’s SORA that was reviewed and held federally constitutional
in Smith. 86 Hinman states the Alaska Supreme Court’s holding
“significantly narrows and undercuts” Smith. 87 Hinman discusses
that Indiana found its retroactive application of the SORA was
78

Id.
H.B. 91, 67th Leg. (Mont. 2021).
80
473 P.3d 406 (Mont. 2020).
81
Id. at 409.
82
Id.
83
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-506(2) (2021).
84
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 6.
85
Id. at 9.
86
Id. (citing Doe v. Alaska, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008)).
87
Id.
79
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unconstitutional even when applying the federal test from Smith.88
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine distinguished its SORA from
Alaska’s: Maine’s law required the offender to verify information
in-person while Alaska’s did not.89 Accordingly, the court held that
Maine’s version of the SORA was punitive, violating both state and
federal constitutions.90
Next, Hinman claims the amendments to Montana’s SORA
should change the Court’s determination of the SORA’s effect.91
Since Mount, the SORA has been amended to increase the
information disseminated to the public.92 The information compiled
regarding the offender’s private affairs has also substantially
increased.93 The requirements “go beyond general notification to the
public and now incorporate law enforcement surveillance goals.”94
Additionally, the amendments to the SORA require more intrusion
into the offender’s life.95 To conclude his argument, Hinman points
to social data supporting registration requirements do not decrease
recidivism or protect the community.96 Instead, it creates an obstacle
for offenders to reintegrate into society.97
B. Appellee’s Argument
The State argues the retroactive application of the SORA is not
an ex post facto violation.98 The individualized assessment of sex
offenders and the SORA’s “emphasis on the risks to the community”
demonstrate that the SORA is not a regulatory scheme intended to
punish.99
First, the State claims the SORA is not excessive because an
offender can petition to remove his registration requirement after a

88

Id. (citing Wallace v. Indiana, 905 N.E.2d 371, 378 (Ind. 2009)).
Id. (citing Maine v. Letalien, 85 A.2d 4, 26 (Me. 2009)).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 12.
92
Id. at 12–13 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-508 (2017)).
93
Id. at 13–14 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-504 (2021)).
94
Id. at 14
95
Id. at 14–15 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-504 (2003) and
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-504 (2017))
96
Id. at 15–16 (citing Molly J. Walker Wilson, The Expansion of
Criminal Registries and the Illusion of Control, 73 LA. L. REV. 509, 520 (2013)).
97
Id. (citing Wilson, supra note 96, at 525).
98
Brief of Appellee, supra note 1, at 17.
99
Id. at 34.
89
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certain period.100 The State concedes the amount of information the
offender is required to provide has increased since Mount but
maintains the law is similar to the information required by Alaska in
Smith. 101 The State asserts that Montana’s individualized
assessments of sex offenders determine the registration time and the
amount of information disseminated; therefore, the SORA is not
excessive.102
Next, the State contends the SORA is not an affirmative
restraint or disability on the offender. Although the offender is now
required to appear in person, 103 the SORA does not restrict where
the level one or two offender works or lives. 104 The burden of
appearing one time a year for a level one offender, twice a year for
a level two offender and four times a year for a level three offender
does not affirmatively restrain or disable the offender.105

IV. ANALYSIS: THE COURT WILL LIKELY FIND THAT THE
AMENDED SORA HAS A PUNITIVE EFFECT; THEREFORE, THE
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE SORA IS AN EX POST FACTO
VIOLATION, AND MOUNT SHOULD BE OVERTURNED.
The Court will likely consider the Mendoza-Martinez factors to
determine the totality of the factors is punitive in effect; thus, the
law violates the ex post facto clause of the Montana Constitution—
and Mount should be overturned.106
The Court will likely find the SORA imposes more of an
affirmative disability on Hinman than Mount. In Mount, the Court
stated Mount only had to appear in person once, to register
initially.107 Now, Hinman is required to return in person twice a year
for at least twenty-five years before he may petition a court for

100

Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 35.
102
Id. at 33 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-509 (2001), MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-23-509 (2021)).
103
Id. at 36.
104
Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-513(6)(b) (2021), MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-23-509).
105
Id.
106
State v. Mount, 78 P.3d 829, 835 (Mont. 2003).
107
Id. at 837.
101
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relief.108 Further, offenders on internet registries may suffer from
limited housing and employment opportunities.109
When evaluating whether the law resembles historical
punishments, the Court will likely find that the dissemination of
offenders’ information on the internet serves to inform the public.
Alternatively, the Court may be persuaded by Justice Leaphart’s
dissent in Mount, postulating that the registry may also embarrass
and “ostracize the convicts” bearing “resemblance to shaming
punishments that were used . . . to disable offenders from living
normally in the community.”110
The Court will likely not find Hinman is being punished for his
past offense. In Mount, the Court determined the defendant was not
being punished for previous criminal behavior because failing to
register is a separate offense. However, the Court may again be
persuaded by Justice Leaphart’s dissent because failing to register is
only imposed on sexual and violent offenders and “severely impairs
[the offender’s] liberty,” it is punishment for the past crime.111
The Court will likely find the information disseminated is
excessive to the SORA’s purpose of protecting the public.112 The
amount of information disseminated to the public has increased
since Mount. 113 Although the offender’s level determines the
amount of information shared, level one offenders, who are deemed
at low risk of reoffending, 114 now have their name, address,
photograph, physical description, date of birth, and offense posted
on the registry. The amended SORA is no longer “tailored to
disclose only necessary information.”115
Lastly, the Court will likely find the requirement that all
offenders register for life is excessive. The SORA does not
individualize the registration term based on the offender’s risk level

108

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-504(6) (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-

23-506(3).
109

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 109 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. (citing Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American
Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1913 (1991)).
111
Mount, 78 P.3d at 842 (Leaphart, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith, 538
U.S. at 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
112
Id. at 840.
113
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-508 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23508 (2021).
114
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-509 (2021).
115
Mount, 78 P.3d at 840.
110
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because all offenders are subject to register for life.116 In Mount, the
Court found the SORA’s lifetime registration requirement was not
excessive because Mount may petition for relief after ten years.117
Here, the registration requirement before Hinman may even petition
for relief has increased to twenty-five years.118
In Sedler, the Court distinguished the importance of the petition
process for sexual offenders than for violent offenders.119 The Court
stated the process requires “judicial determinations requiring
discretionary considerations.” 120 The petition process reviews
whether the offender has remained law-abiding and whether
registration is no longer necessary for protecting the public.121 These
discretionary considerations should be determined when imposing
the registration duration rather than applying a lifetime registration
to low risk and moderate risk offenders. For offenders deemed at
low or moderate risk of reoffending, registration for life is excessive.
Based on the totality of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the
Court will likely find the SORA post-Mount is punitive in effect;
thus, the law violates the ex post facto clause of the Montana
Constitution. As a result, Mount should be overturned.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court in State v. Hinman has an opportunity to reconsider
whether the SORA acts as retroactive punishment prohibited by the
ex post facto clause of the Montana Constitution. The Court will
likely apply the intent-effect test used in Mount to assess whether
the amended SORA is punitive in its effect. If the Court finds the
effect of the SORA is punitive, the law violates the Montana
Constitution’s ex post facto clause. For the reasons discussed above,
the Montana Supreme Court will apply the Mendoza-Martinez
factors to determine whether the SORA is punitive in effect.
Therefore, the Court will likely find the amended SORA is a
violation of the ex post facto clause of the Montana Constitution and
that Mount should be overruled.

116

Id. at § 46-23-506
Mount, 78 P.3d at 837–38.
118
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-506(3).
119
State v. Sedler, 473 P.3d 406, 409 (Mont. 2020).
120
Id.
121
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-506(3).
117

